Since the war began, the United States and Iran have held several rounds of negotiations. Only one produced a formal outcome: a memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad on June 18. That document collapsed within days. An analysis published as an opinion piece argues that the repeated failures cannot be explained only by the wording of the proposals, and that a deeper psychological pattern is at work.
The author sets aside the view that the failure lies mainly in the details of the provisions. Instead, the argument is that a syndrome shaped by years of hostile relations between Washington and Tehran is blocking progress. In international relations, the author notes, deep crises can leave lasting marks on political memory and make rapprochement harder.
Two historical complexes shaping the standoff
According to the analysis, the syndrome consists of two complexes. The first is the one Washington developed after the 1979 siege of the US embassy in Tehran. The second is the one Tehran developed from what it sees as long-standing US hostility, culminating in Washington’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018.
The roots of the rupture go back to August 1953, when US and British intelligence agencies helped overthrow the nationalist government of Mohammad Mosaddegh, who had nationalised the oil industry in 1951. The author says that this episode fixed a belief in Iranian political thinking that Washington will not tolerate an independent government in Tehran and will act to undermine one that opposes its interests. In that light, Washington’s decision in October 1979 to host Shah Reza Pahlavi for medical treatment, after he had been overthrown, was read in revolutionary Tehran as a possible prelude to a second coup.
Iranian students stormed the US embassy on November 4, 1979, and held 52 Americans for 444 days. Diplomatic relations were severed and, the article notes, have not been restored since. Tehran portrays the takeover as a defence of the revolution, while in the United States it fixed an image of Iran as a state that ignores international norms and should not be rewarded.
The author describes the embassy complex less as a memory of the event itself and more as an unwritten rule in US policymaking: Iran must concede first, and that concession must be verified before Washington offers anything in return. The Iranian complex, in turn, hardened into the belief that an American signature guarantees nothing and that negotiation can be a cover for war.
How each side’s proposals mirror its past
The analysis argues that the recent initiatives from both sides reflect these complexes. It says the US proposals consistently ask for Iranian action before any reward. A 15-point plan put forward in March, for example, demanded the dismantling of the Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow facilities, an end to uranium enrichment, the suspension of Iran’s missile programme and the abandonment of its regional allies, in exchange for promises of later sanctions relief.
A May draft prepared by White House envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner tied the release of Iran’s frozen funds to a prior suspension of enrichment. The American response in September also called for enrichment to be frozen and inspectors to enter during the negotiation period. In the author’s reading, the constant thread is that Iranian action comes first and verification comes before trust.
Iranian proposals, the article says, follow the opposite logic. A five-point response in late March demanded guarantees that the war would not be repeated. Ten points put forward in April called for a binding UN Security Council resolution to shield any agreement from being overturned. A 14-point plan in May asked for a nonaggression pledge that included Israel. A seven-day plan proposed by Tehran last month called for sanctions and the US naval blockade to be lifted before the Strait of Hormuz reopened, with nuclear talks to begin afterward.
The author concludes that each side drafted its texts to protect itself from a repeat of its own history with the other, rather than to meet the other halfway. In this view, the gap in substance has narrowed, but the gap in trust has not.
The Islamabad memorandum and the sequencing dispute
The analysis presents the Islamabad memorandum as the closest the two sides came to a settlement, because it was designed to address the core concerns of both. To answer Washington’s concerns, it called for diluting Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium and made the lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of funds dependent on Iranian implementation. To answer Tehran’s concerns, it provided for an end to hostilities, mutual respect for sovereignty, a monitoring mechanism and UN Security Council approval of a final agreement. Ballistic missiles were not mentioned in the text.
The agreement did not hold. Tehran suspended its participation in the Geneva round of talks because there was no ceasefire in Lebanon, a demand the author says had appeared in every Iranian initiative since March. In Tehran’s reading, Washington’s failure to restrain Israel showed that an American signature was not enough. The author says the withdrawal complex then took hold and the two sides returned to their starting positions.
By late September, informed sources indicated that the dispute had moved from substance to sequencing. The argument now centres on the order of steps rather than their content, and the stated aim has become a return to an enhanced version of the June memorandum. The author describes the two complexes at their clearest here: Washington wants the Strait of Hormuz opened and enrichment frozen first because it does not trust Iran, while Tehran wants the naval blockade lifted first because it does not trust the United States.
The article also compares Pompeo’s 2018 conditions with the June memorandum. It finds that US demands have shifted from redefining Iran’s regional role to focusing on the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian demands, meanwhile, have moved from compensation to be paid by Washington toward a conditional investment fund financed by other parties.
Still, the author argues the two complexes have not weakened. They may have deepened during the war, feeding each other until they form a single syndrome. Any new sequencing formula, however precise, is unlikely to break the deadlock unless it addresses both complexes at once, which the author says would require a third party able to guarantee both action and reciprocal action at the same time.
