Renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region is raising fears of instability across the Horn of Africa. Against this backdrop, the United Arab Emirates’ public support for Ethiopia’s federal government and Saudi Arabia’s history of regional diplomacy are attracting close attention.
Both Gulf states have strategic stakes in the Horn of Africa, but their roles differ. The UAE has openly sided with the Ethiopian government. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, previously helped broker a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and was reported in 2025 to have offered to mediate between the two countries.
UAE backs Ethiopian government as Tigray clashes intensify
The renewed clashes threaten to undo the November 2022 Pretoria agreement, which brought an end to the war between federal forces and Tigrayan fighters. Tensions with Eritrea add to concerns that the conflict could widen into a broader confrontation.
On September 25, Abu Dhabi condemned attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups on federal forces, the capture of airports in Tigray, and escalating violence in the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara. Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE minister of state, said the country stood in solidarity with the Ethiopian government and people. He also affirmed support for Ethiopia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria agreement.
The statement made clear that the UAE backs the federal government while urging de-escalation and dialogue. It did not say whether the UAE is supplying military assistance, or whether it has secured pledges from the warring parties to stop fighting.
Commercial ties also shape Abu Dhabi’s interest in the region. DP World operates the Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 links that port with Jebel Ali in the UAE, offering an extra corridor for cargo bound for inland destinations such as Ethiopia. Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993 and depends heavily on Djibouti for access to global trade. These links help explain the UAE’s stake in stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa, but they do not show that Abu Dhabi can sway the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to step back, or alter Ethiopia’s military plans. How far the UAE can use its ties with the federal government to push for a political response remains unclear.
Saudi Arabia silent on the latest Tigray fighting
Saudi Arabia has not yet set out a public position on the latest fighting in Tigray. According to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, the kingdom has not publicly commented on the renewed war, although earlier this year it made diplomatic efforts to ease tensions between the federal government and the TPLF.
Riyadh’s mediation record is also under review. Chatham House reported in November 2025, citing sources, that Saudi Arabia had offered to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea as tensions grew over maritime access and regional security. A June 2026 analysis by the German think tank SWP said earlier Saudi mediation had failed, partly because the talks did not address Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.
An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as backing Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions. That assessment concerns regional alignment, however, and does not show that Saudi Arabia is directly supplying military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting. Red Sea security matters to Riyadh because the waterway is a key route for international shipping and for its oil exports, but whether the kingdom will take a more visible diplomatic role as tensions rise remains an open question.
Egypt, Eritrea and the dispute over Red Sea access
Egypt’s role is shaped by its long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and by its growing ties with Eritrea. Cairo has argued that responsibility for governing and securing the Red Sea lies with the countries along its shores, a view that Asmara shares. The issue adds to regional strain as Ethiopia seeks dependable access to the sea.
In September, Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the TPLF. His remarks, reported on September 28, were not backed by evidence. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, later reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference and rejected suggestions that Egypt had abandoned those principles, though he did not directly address the claim of Egyptian support for the TPLF.
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026. Egypt’s presidency said the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security, and that both leaders stressed coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting pointed to closer ties between Cairo and Asmara but did not establish that either country was involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.
The wider risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups, while Eritrea denies the allegations and has asked the United Nations Security Council to intervene. Addis Ababa treats reliable sea access as a national priority, whereas Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty. The allegations remain contested, but deteriorating relations have raised the stakes of the fighting in northern Ethiopia.
Limits of outside influence and the path to talks
A wider confrontation could endanger more civilians, complicate humanitarian access and disrupt regional trade and security. The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could offer a channel for diplomacy, and Saudi Arabia’s record of regional mediation could create an opening for renewed talks. However, the available public evidence does not show that either country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis, or that either has decisive influence over the fighting.
The Pretoria agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, but the renewed fighting highlights how hard it is to sustain peace while underlying disputes persist. Analysts quoted in the reporting agree that a durable settlement will depend mainly on the parties themselves, with outside partners able to help by encouraging restraint and backing credible negotiations. The contribution of the UAE and Saudi Arabia should be judged by whether it produces concrete steps towards de-escalation, renewed political dialogue and lower tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic work may create openings, but they are not a substitute for progress on the ground.
