Political partnerships in Pakistan seldom last long. Parties that join forces against one government can end up on opposite sides in the next contest, and old rivals can become allies once their interests line up. A recent analysis of the career of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman shows how clearly this pattern plays out in his case.
The renewed focus on Fazl follows remarks by Ikhtiar Wali Khan, the Prime Minister’s Coordinator for Information and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Affairs. In an interview with HUM News’ ‘Hum Dekhen Gay’, he said Fazl could be considered for the post of provincial governor if he wanted it. “If Maulana himself wants to become the governor of KP, it can be considered, while the Pakistan People’s Party would also have no objection to giving him the position,” Ikhtiar Wali said.
The offer comes as the federal government and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) remain at odds over the future of the province, which is under an emergency and governor’s rule. The analysis argues that these tensions have returned Fazl to the centre of discussions about possible political realignments.
From the MRD to the MMA and the 17th Amendment
Fazl rose to prominence within the JUI after the death of his father, Mufti Mahmood, and became one of the country’s best-known religious and political figures. In 1983, the JUI joined the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), an opposition alliance that aimed to challenge the military rule of Gen Zia-ul-Haq. The alliance included the PPP and several other parties, and the analysis describes it as a turning point that pulled the JUI beyond its traditional religious base.
In the 1990s, governments led by the PPP and the PML-N rose and fell in quick succession, with fresh elections following each dismissal. The JUI-F worked with one party and opposed the other as circumstances changed. Rather than committing to a single major party, Fazl kept channels open to several political forces, a approach that helped his party stay part of national debate despite a relatively small electoral base.
A major turning point came before the 2002 general election, when the JUI-F joined other religious parties to form the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The alliance did well at the polls, formed the government in the then North-West Frontier Province, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KP, and became a coalition partner in Balochistan. Its success gave religious parties more seats in parliament and a chance to hold executive power at the provincial level.
The MMA’s dealings with the military government of General Pervez Musharraf, however, raised questions about its consistency. Although the alliance criticised aspects of military rule, its parliamentary members backed the 17th Constitutional Amendment in December 2003. The amendment gave constitutional cover to key elements of Musharraf’s Legal Framework Order and restored the president’s power to dissolve the National Assembly, subject to constitutional safeguards. The MMA said its stance was political pragmatism, while critics saw a compromise that weakened its claim to oppose the government. Disputes among its members over strategy and elections later weakened the alliance, and differences between the JUI-F and Jamaat-e-Islami were among the factors cited.
Cabinet seats, opposition benches and the PDM
After the 2008 general election, the JUI-F entered the PPP-led coalition at the Centre, showing a willingness to work with a major rival when conditions allowed. The partnership ended in December 2010. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani dismissed the party’s minister, Azam Khan Swati, amid a dispute linked to allegations of irregularities in arrangements for Pakistani pilgrims travelling to Saudi Arabia. The JUI-F objected to the dismissal and moved to the opposition benches. The analysis says the episode showed both the scope and the limits of Fazl’s accommodation with government.
Fazl also served as chairman of the Parliamentary Kashmir Committee from 2008 to 2018, a period that spanned both PPP and PML-N governments. The post gave him a prominent role in parliamentary discussions on Kashmir.
Cooperation between the JUI-F and the PML-N became especially visible after the 2013 general election. The two parties did not agree on everything, but they found common ground in parliament and later in opposition to Imran Khan’s government. After the 2018 elections, Fazl challenged the credibility of the results and demanded Khan’s resignation. In October 2019, he led an anti-government march on Islamabad, which posed a serious challenge to the newly elected government.
In September 2020, the JUI-F, the PML-N, the PPP and several other parties formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), with Fazl chosen to lead it. The alliance’s most significant result came in April 2022, when a parliamentary vote of no-confidence removed Khan as prime minister. Afterwards, however, the coalition’s unity frayed. Its members disagreed over joining the new administration, political strategy and the direction of the opposition. The analysis argues that shared opposition to a government does not guarantee agreement on governance once that goal is reached.
Engagement with PTI after the 2024 election
The relationship between Fazl and the PTI has changed sharply. During Khan’s government the two were bitter opponents, with differences spanning electoral, political and religious issues. The 2024 general election, and disputes over its results, the formation of the new government and the opposition’s parliamentary strategy, opened space for contact between the two sides.
Their engagement developed gradually rather than through a sudden, comprehensive alliance. The parties explored cooperation on constitutional and political matters while keeping their differences on other questions. By September 2026, according to the analysis, the JUI-F had agreed to take part in a multi-party conference organised by the PTI, and the two sides discussed a possible joint opposition strategy on national issues.
The analysis cautions that attending a conference does not by itself create a permanent electoral or parliamentary alliance. Contact, cooperation on a specific issue and a formal alliance are distinct arrangements, and treating them as the same would overstate how far relations between the two parties have moved.
