Attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis on Saudi Arabia have pushed the war in Yemen to a new level, according to an analysis published as an opinion piece. The author says the targeting of civilian infrastructure, including airports, has killed at least a dozen people and injured hundreds. In the author’s view, these strikes have left no room for the “red lines” that previously set the limits of escalation.
The author describes the Houthi campaign as a reckless gamble that is not in the group’s own interest. He argues that the Houthis know retaliation will be fierce, yet continue their attacks to serve Iran’s agenda of raising tensions before the United States midterm elections. Given this motivation to escalate, the author believes the situation could develop along two broad paths: a major region-wide operation against the Houthis, or a war of attrition.
Saudi Arabia seeks regional and international backing
According to the analysis, Saudi Arabia is working to secure maximum international support and to deepen its regional and international alliances. The aim, the author says, is to build a united front capable of confronting what has become a regional threat. Riyadh is looking to its Gulf neighbours, which are themselves affected by the continuing conflict, and there is a shared recognition that all of them face serious danger.
The author expects Gulf states, perhaps with the exception of Oman, to support Riyadh both directly and indirectly in the fighting in Yemen. He also says Pakistan and Turkiye are likely to join the effort. Both countries have signed a defence agreement with Saudi Arabia known as the Mecca Pact. The pact is due to be ratified by the Turkish parliament within days, which would open the way for Turkish military deployment in support of Saudi Arabia.
The author adds that indirect involvement by Turkiye and Pakistan, including logistical and intelligence support, appears to be already well under way. A direct US intervention is also possible, the analysis says, although it seems unlikely before the midterms, because military engagements in the Middle East remain unpopular with US voters.
Counteroffensive, Sanaa and internal divisions in Yemen
The author says a region-wide coalition could support the counteroffensive already being carried out by forces loyal to the internationally recognised Yemeni government. Such a push could help retake the western coastal region, including areas beyond Bab al-Mandeb and Dhubab. Gains of this kind could ease pressure on Red Sea shipping and potentially shift the military balance in favour of the government.
Opening additional fronts across other Yemeni cities and governorates could stretch Houthi forces and disperse their resources, the author argues, increasing the likelihood of further government advances. Retaking Sanaa could also be on the horizon. However, the analysis identifies the main obstacle as internal discord among factions within the government itself, which it says is worsened by negative external interference that deepens these rifts.
The author acknowledges that recent government measures have produced noticeable progress on the ground. These include efforts to unify decision-making and consolidate the military operations command. Still, he says that reaching the goal of retaking Sanaa will require sustained effort and focused determination.
If government forces make substantial gains, the author says, the Houthis could offer concessions in exchange for a pause in fighting. He notes that the group has done this before, but argues its purpose would not be peace. Instead, it would buy breathing room to regroup and return to fighting later, a point negotiators should keep in mind.
Economic and regional costs of a prolonged war
The analysis warns that if the Saudi-led coalition and the Yemeni government were to be weakened by internal divisions, progress against the Houthis could slow. In that case, the Houthis could hold their positions, increase pressure on the strategic town of Taiz, and continue attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. The author says this could increase civilian casualties and displacement and prolong the war without a decisive military outcome.
The author also says the conflict would have a significant economic impact on Saudi Arabia, complicating its development goals because it would have to prioritise defence spending. Other Gulf economies would also be hurt, he argues, given Saudi Arabia’s central role in the region. Losing ground to the Houthis would mean the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz would continue, disrupting energy exports from the region.
In this scenario, the author writes, Yemen would reach a deadlock with “no victor, no vanquished”, but Iran would emerge as the winner. A war of attrition along the Red Sea coast would give Tehran room to ease pressure on its own war efforts. It could also use the Houthi card as leverage in its intermittent negotiations with the international community, the analysis says, encouraging it to raise its conditions and demands.
The author concludes that the only way to resolve the crisis in Yemen is decisive military action led by the Yemeni government and backed by a region-wide coalition. For that to happen, he says, the government must first get its internal affairs and its relations with allies in order.
