In Pakistan, an elected provincial government cannot be dismissed simply because the federal government disagrees with it, desires a change in administration, or views its governance as inadequate. The constitution outlines specific procedures through which a provincial government may cease to function or temporarily lose executive powers before the completion of its five-year term.
Legal experts emphasize a crucial distinction between mechanisms that remove a government via the provincial assembly and exceptional constitutional provisions allowing the federation to temporarily assume provincial functions. One lawyer explains that since the 18th Amendment, the options for removing a chief minister are limited and all involve the assembly’s participation: a chief minister can be ousted if one-fifth of the assembly members initiate a motion and a majority votes against him, if the governor concludes he has lost the assembly’s confidence and summons it accordingly, if he dissolves the assembly himself, or if he loses his seat due to disqualification or defection. Thus, a government can fall without a formal no-confidence vote, but it cannot be dismissed without the assembly’s involvement.
Another legal perspective differentiates between removing the chief minister and dismissing the entire provincial government, noting that the only full removal of a government occurs through a no-confidence vote against the chief minister under Article 136.
Historically, governors wielded broader powers to dissolve provincial assemblies with presidential approval. Previously, under Article 112(2)(b), a governor could dissolve an assembly if it was deemed that the province could not be governed constitutionally and new elections were necessary. This power was abolished by the 13th Amendment in 1997, reinstated by Musharraf in 2002, and removed again by the 18th Amendment in 2010. Currently, a governor can only dissolve an assembly if the chief minister has lost a no-confidence vote, no alternative majority can be formed, and with the president’s consent.
Since the 18th Amendment, the constitution does not authorize a governor to dismiss an elected provincial government or dissolve the assembly solely because the federal government desires a different administration. The 1988 dismissal of the Punjab Assembly and cabinet serves as a precedent where the Lahore High Court ruled the grounds for dissolution legally untenable, emphasizing that discretionary dissolution powers must be based on objective constitutional grounds rather than political whims.
Regarding federal intervention under Article 234, the president may act if, based on a governor’s report, it is determined that the provincial government cannot function constitutionally. The president can assume or direct the governor to assume provincial functions, but continuation beyond two months requires parliamentary approval, with a maximum duration of six months.
Constitutional provisions operate in two modes: ordinary governance and emergency. Under Article 232, a state of emergency may be declared due to threats like war, external aggression, or internal disturbances beyond provincial control. For internal disturbances, a resolution from the provincial assembly is required. The federal government may then assume provincial functions and parliament can legislate on provincial matters, altering the federal-provincial balance.
Legal experts stress that the threshold for an emergency based on internal disturbance must be genuine and exceed provincial capacity to manage. Political disagreements or anticipated protests do not meet this standard, and any proclamation without assembly resolution may face constitutional challenges.
Courts have previously ruled that while a proclamation may suspend a chief minister, it cannot remove him. The constitution provides clear mechanisms through assembly votes to determine whether a chief minister commands majority support or should be removed via a no-confidence motion. There is no constitutional provision granting the governor or federal government unilateral power to dismiss a provincial government due to political differences or policy disputes.
Experts warn that allowing federal dismissal of provincial governments based on political disagreements risks reviving past abuses when governments were dismissed arbitrarily. Such actions could undermine democratic stability and constitutional norms. Some express skepticism about judicial safeguards under the current constitutional framework, though mechanisms for constitutional review remain in place despite recent amendments.
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