Air traffic controller staffing at LaGuardia Airport on the night of the Air Canada jet collision with a fire truck potentially breached established procedures by merging roles prior to midnight, a recently reviewed document reveals. The crash, occurring around 11:37 p.m. ET on March 22, resulted in the deaths of both pilots and has intensified scrutiny over U.S. air traffic control staffing shortages and the increasing workload faced by controllers nationwide.
Controller shortages, particularly at supervisory levels, have led to more frequent combining of local air and ground traffic responsibilities, several controllers across the country. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) announced last week that its investigation into the crash includes gathering details on the specific duties each controller was performing at the time. If it is confirmed that the controller was managing both air and ground operations simultaneously, this would conflict with LaGuardia Tower’s standard operating procedures.
In fact, a 1997 NTSB final report on a previous collision at LaGuardia between a private jet and a vehicle prompted the implementation of new rules to prevent such role combinations before midnight. This policy remains in effect as of 2023, the LaGuardia Tower Standard Operating Procedures document, which insiders confirm is still current in 2026. The document explicitly states that positions at LaGuardia Tower should not be consolidated into one before midnight local time or 90 minutes after the shift starts, whichever is later.
The Federal Aviation Administration, responsible for U.S. air traffic control, declined to comment on the matter.
Regarding controller duties during the accident, NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy indicated that two controllers were present in the tower’s glass-enclosed section: a local controller managing active runways and immediate airspace, and a controller-in-charge who also provided departure clearances. However, it remains unclear who was handling the ground controller role, which oversees aircraft and vehicle movements on taxiways, excluding active runways. Conflicting information exists about this position during the incident.
Several current and former controllers, analyzing audio from LiveATC.net, believe the local controller was simultaneously managing ground traffic. The NTSB has not provided further comment. Typically, air crash investigations reveal accidents stem from multiple contributing factors rather than a single cause.
The controller-in-charge signed in at 10:30 p.m., and the local controller followed at 10:45 p.m., Homendy. LaGuardia’s procedures specify that the local and ground positions should not be combined before midnight. Additionally, consolidation of positions should only occur when traffic volume allows, with roles separated again as traffic increases.
On the night of the crash, weather-related delays led to 70 commercial flights taking off or landing between 10 p.m. and 11:37 p.m., compared to an average of 53 flights during the same period since 2022, based on Cirium data. Multiple controllers described the workload that evening as heavy, with the usual practice being to bring in additional controllers or extend shifts to handle increased traffic.
A current New York-area controller, speaking anonymously, emphasized that the local and ground roles should have remained separate until at least midnight, especially considering the volume and complexity of traffic that night.
