The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) has formally contested a recent decision by the Lahore High Court (LHC) concerning Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz and the ongoing inquiry related to the Chaudhry Sugar Mills case. This legal battle has now escalated to the Federal Constitutional Court, where NAB seeks to overturn the LHC’s ruling that questioned the bureau’s authority in handling the case. The matter revolves around allegations of money laundering and unexplained wealth linked to questionable business dealings involving Chaudhry Sugar Mills, a company in which Maryam Nawaz held a significant shareholding.
To provide some background, the Lahore High Court initially granted Maryam Nawaz bail in November 2019, imposing the condition that she surrender her passport to the court as a security measure. This was a critical step in the legal proceedings, reflecting the seriousness of the accusations. However, in October 2022, a full bench of the LHC decided to return her passport after NAB indicated it no longer required the travel document for the investigation. This development suggested a shift in the bureau’s stance on the case, which later culminated in the closure of the inquiry.
In its petition to the Federal Constitutional Court, NAB argued that the Lahore High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction by interfering with the powers vested in the NAB chairman. The bureau emphasized that the LHC’s February 4, 2026, order, which mandated judicial approval before NAB could close the inquiry, was legally unfounded and should be declared void. NAB maintained that it possesses the exclusive authority to withdraw investigations before formally filing a reference in court, a power enshrined in the NAB amendments under Section 31B(1).
Moreover, NAB highlighted that the Chaudhry Sugar Mills case was essentially a private dispute, not involving any direct loss to the national treasury. Throughout the investigation, the bureau found no concrete evidence pointing to corruption or illicit conduct by Maryam Nawaz. This lack of incriminating proof ultimately led NAB to conclude that the inquiry did not warrant continuation. The bureau also criticized the LHC for misinterpreting the legal provisions, particularly Section 31B(1), by insisting on accountability court approval for closing the case, which NAB described as an unwarranted judicial overreach.
The petition further contended that the LHC’s order effectively amended the law by inserting a requirement that Parliament had never intended. NAB argued that if legislative intent had been to require judicial sanction before withdrawing proceedings, such a stipulation would have been explicitly included in the statutory language. By imposing this condition, the court was, in NAB’s view, altering the legal framework without parliamentary approval, a move that undermines the separation of powers.
It is important to recall that Maryam Nawaz had been accused of engaging in money laundering and conducting suspicious financial transactions through her association with Chaudhry Sugar Mills. However, after a thorough investigation, NAB closed the case, deeming it a private matter rather than a public corruption issue. Following the inquiry’s closure, Maryam Nawaz petitioned the Lahore High Court for the return of her Rs70 million surety bonds, which had been submitted as part of her bail conditions.
The LHC responded by directing NAB to present a report on the inquiry’s closure before the accountability court and ordered that the court decide on the matter of the surety bonds within one month. NAB, however, maintained that once proceedings are withdrawn at the inquiry stage, the accountability court lacks jurisdiction over the case. The bureau emphasized that the law does not require judicial approval for such withdrawals, and the court’s attempt to impose this condition was legally baseless.
Additionally, NAB pointed out procedural irregularities in the LHC’s decision-making process, noting that the court issued its ruling without notifying the Attorney General’s office, which is a significant oversight in legal protocol. The bureau asserted that once the NAB chairman authorized the withdrawal of the case, the LHC had no authority to reinterpret or challenge that decision. Furthermore, NAB criticized the Lahore High Court for taking suo motu notice of the matter despite lacking the proper jurisdiction to do so.
The appeal against the LHC’s ruling has been filed through an additional prosecutor general, signaling NAB’s determination to defend its statutory powers and ensure that the inquiry’s closure stands without judicial interference. This case highlights ongoing tensions between accountability institutions and the judiciary over procedural authority and the limits of legal oversight in high-profile corruption investigations.
